Lending Channels and Financial Shocks: The Case of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Trade Credit and the Japanese Banking Crisis by Kenshi Taketa & Gregory F. Udell
1
Lending Channels 
and Financial Shocks: 
The Case of Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprise 
Trade Credit and the 
Japanese Banking Crisis
Kenshi Taketa and Gregory F. Udell
We offer a new paradigm for understanding the impact of financial shocks on the
flow of credit to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Drawing from
research on the lending view of monetary policy and research on SME financial
contracting, we introduce the concept of “lending channels.” A lending channel is
a two-dimensional conduit through which SMEs obtain financing. In particular,
a lending channel consists of a specific lending technology provided by a specific type
of institution.We hypothesize that during financial shocks some lending channels
may close and other channels may expand to absorb the slack. We empirically 
test a possible implication of this hypothesis by examining whether one lending
channel, trade credit, played a significant role as a substitute for other lending
channels in offsetting a contraction in SME lending of other lending channels
during the Japanese financial crisis.We find little evidence that trade credit played
such a role. To the contrary, we find some evidence that trade credit and financial
institution lending are complements, rather than substitutes, during the Japanese
financial crisis periods. This does not preclude the possibility that other lending
channels may have behaved in a manner consistent with this hypothesis.
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There is mounting evidence that monetary shocks may have a disproportionate effect
on the behavior of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Beginning with the
early literature on the credit channel, researchers have focused on the potential effects
that these shocks might have on bank-dependent borrowers who do not have access to
the capital markets for their external financing (e.g., Bernanke and Blinder [1988],
Kashyap and Stein [1995], Gertler and Gilchrist [1994], and Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist [1996]). Non-monetary policy shocks may also have similar effects on SMEs,
as may have been the case with the credit crunch in the United States between 1990–92
and the Japanese financial crises during the 1990s.
The analysis of the effect of financial shocks on SMEs can be viewed in the broader
context of credit availability and financial system architecture. Some of the research 
in this area has focused on the importance of the overall development of a financial 
system and its ability to relax credit constraints to promote growth in externally 
dependent sectors (Levine [1997, 2005], Rajan and Zingales [1998], and Kroszner 
and Strahan [2005]). More recently, research in this area has turned its attention to 
the association between financial development and credit constraints during banking 
crises. This work suggests that growth in externally dependent sectors is slower during
a banking crisis and that the contraction of credit during a crisis may be greater in
“deeper” financial systems (Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan [2005] and Kroszner,
Laeven, and Klingebiel [2007]). Our approach in this paper is to attempt to penetrate 
further into the meaning of financial development. We focus on the banking crises in
a single country, Japan, and ask the following question: does the impact of a financial
shock on SME credit constraints depend on how SME loans are underwritten? More
specifically: does the impact of a financial shock depend on the specific linkages between
the institutions that provide credit and the manner in which that credit is provided? 
Our understanding of SME loan underwriting has recently been the focus of 
considerable research effort. This began with the literature on SME financing that
emphasized relationship building as the defining characteristic of SME lending (e.g.,
Rajan [1992], Petersen and Rajan [1994] and Berger and Udell [1995]). Subsequent
research, on balance, adopted the view that SME lending falls into two categories:
relationship lending and transaction lending (e.g., Cole, Goldberg, and White [2004]
and Berger et al. [2005]). New research, however, offers a richer view emphasizing
that SME lending consists of a variety of different lending technologies. This research
emphasizes that in addition to the “relationship lending technology” there are many
other transaction lending technologies which are deployed globally in providing debt
finance to SMEs (Berger and Udell [2002, 2006]).
While this new research emphasizes the breadth of lending technologies and how
their mix might differ across countries with different institutional and legal infra-
structures, it is still a static concept in the sense that it does not take into account how
the mix might be affected by macroeconomic conditions and, particularly, financial
shocks such as changes in monetary policy, credit crunches, and financial crises. In this 
paper, we build on the notion of lending technologies by introducing the concept of 
“lending channels.” A lending channel is a two-dimensional conduit through which
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technology provided by a specific type of institution. For example, relationship 
lending delivered by small banks would be a lending channel. We adopt the view 
articulated in these new papers on lending technologies that there exist at least 
nine lending technologies globally which may be used to underwrite SME lending: 
relationship lending, financial statement lending, trade credit, small business credit
scoring, asset-based lending, equipment lending, real estate-based lending, leasing, and
factoring (see Berger and Udell [2006]). The number of financial institutions that
deliver one or more of these technologies likely varies significantly across countries. In
Japan, for example, we hypothesize that there are six types of institutions which deliver
one or more of these technologies. Furthermore, we hypothesize that in Japan the 
combination of lending technologies and institution types is currently associated with
31 lending channels. More generally, we view our lending channel paradigm as a useful
way for policymakers to view the impact of financial shocks on SME credit availability.
The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we develop more fully the concept of
the lending channel and what these lending channels might look like in different
countries. Second, we hypothesize how these channels might be affected by financial
shocks. We show how some of these channels might be shut off during certain types of
financial shocks while other channels produce more credit availability. We speculate
based on existing evidence in the literature connecting institutions and lending that
the specific nature of the financial shock may determine which channels are most
affected. And finally, we test one implication of our theory of lending channels 
during the Japanese crisis. Specifically, we examine the extent to which one of these
lending channels, trade credit, may have played a significant role in offsetting contrac-
tions in the flow of credit to SMEs through other lending channels. While we do not
view our empirical analysis as a complete test of our theory of lending channels, we do
view it as suggestive of the kinds of tests that can be conducted to determine the
power of our lending channel paradigm to explain the impact of financial crises on
this important sector of business activity. 
In the next section of the paper, we motivate and flesh out the details of our 
lending channel paradigm. We compare how lending channels might appear in two
large developed economies, the United States and Japan. In this section, we also 
consider the potential impact of different types of financial shocks on lending 
channels. In Section III, we develop the framework for our empirical tests of how one
specific lending channel, trade credit, may have behaved during the Japanese financial
crises. Here we briefly review the literature on trade credit in general, and Japan in
particular. We also motivate the hypothesis we test empirically that the trade credit
lending channel may have increased credit availability to SMEs to offset a contraction
in the flow of credit through other Japanese lending channels. We note in advance
that available data do not permit an examination of each lending channel in 
Japan during the banking crisis. However, our data do permit an examination of 
the behavior of one specific lending channel (trade credit) and combinations of 
other lending channels. In Section IV, we present our data and model specification.
Our empirical results are presented in Section V. In Section VI, we discuss some policy
implications of our paradigm and offer some concluding thoughts. 
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In this section, we introduce a new paradigm to explain the potential impact of finan-
cial shocks on SME financing. This paradigm builds on the recent work that empha-
sizes that lenders provide external SME financing through a variety of different
lending technologies (Berger and Udell [2006], hereafter BU [2006]). We extend BU
(2006), which is essentially static with respect to macro and business cycle effects, and
make it dynamic by introducing the concept of “lending channels.” Our SME lending
channels are two-dimensional lending conduits that may expand or contract in
response to financial shocks. The manner in which these lending channels expand 
or contract will determine the overall impact of a financial shock on SME credit 
availability. We note that these lending channels may vary significantly across 
countries. We proceed in this section by first reviewing the BU (2006) concept of
lending technologies and their relationship to a country’s financial institution structure
and lending infrastructure. Then we introduce our concept of lending channels. 
We conclude by offering hypotheses about the nature of lending channels in two 
developed countries, Japan and the United States, and how they might behave during
financial shocks. 
BU (2006) offers a paradigm of SME financing which emphasizes that an SME 
loan is not a homogeneous product where “one size fits all.” Instead, it emphasizes
that SME lending comes in a variety of different forms, which it calls “lending 
technologies.” While this observation at first blush may seem intuitive, it is strikingly
at variance with most of the relatively new literature on bank lending. The innovation
in BU (2006) can be best viewed in the context of the evolution of the strand 
of the literature on bank lending that began with the papers on bank uniqueness.
These papers on bank uniqueness showed that markets responded positively to the
announcement of bank lending facilities (James [1987], Lummer and McConnell
[1989], and Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel [1995]). The explicit point in these
papers is that bank loans differ from capital market products (e.g., corporate bonds)
because banks have a unique ability to produce information about their borrowers.
This theme was echoed in subsequent theoretical and empirical literature that focused
on ferreting out the unique nature of the bank loan underwriting process (e.g., Rajan
[1992], Petersen and Rajan [1994, 1995], and Berger and Udell [1995]). These
papers emphasize that bank lending is different because it involves (1) the generation
of private information by lenders that is proprietary in nature; (2) information 
that tends to be soft in the sense that it is not easily communicated internally or 
externally;
1 and (3) information production that is associated with relationship 
building. Also implicit in this literature is the notion that the commercial bank loan 
is a relatively homogeneous product distinct from the debt products generated in the
capital markets.
However, a number of subsequent papers began to emphasize that SME lending
appears to come in two forms rather than just one. These two forms consist of 
relationship lending and transaction-based lending (e.g., Berger and Udell [1995],
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1. See Stein (2002) for a subsequent model that focuses on difficulties in disseminating soft-loan information internally.Cole, Goldberg, and White [2004], Scott [2004], and Berger et al. [2005]).
Relationship lending that is based on soft information is targeted to relatively more
opaque SMEs, while transaction-based lending is targeted to relatively more trans-
parent SMEs. BU (2006), however, takes exception to this dichotomous view of 
SME lending. It emphasizes that instead of just two types of SME lending there 
are many types—a relationship technology that utilizes soft information and many
different kinds of transaction-based technologies, all of which utilize hard information.
In addition, it notes that most of these transaction-based technologies are targeted to
relatively informationally opaque borrowers. This contrasts with the extant literature,
which had viewed transaction lending as virtually entirely focused on relatively 
transparent borrowers.
The technologies identified by BU (2006) had been analyzed individually in both
the practitioner and academic literature (e.g., Carey, Post, and Sharpe [1998], Hendel
and Lizzeri [2002], Bakker, Klapper, and Udell [2004], Burkart and Ellingsen [2004],
Udell [2004], and Berger, Frame, and Miller [2005]). However, these papers had not
been connected, in effect, to the literature on “relationship lending” in the sense that
the literature had continued to evolve under the assumption that SME lending was
essentially dichotomous.
The technologies identified by BU (2006) are shown in Table 1. They consist of
relationship lending, financial statement lending, asset-based lending, factoring, 
leasing, small business credit scoring, equipment lending, real estate-based lending,
and trade credit. Relationship lending is a lending technology targeted to opaque
SMEs that relies primarily on soft information gathered through contact over time
with the SME, its owner, and the local community to address the opacity problem.
This information is acquired in large part by the loan officer through direct contact
with the borrower and by observing the SME’s performance across all dimensions of
its banking relationship. Financial statement lending is a lending technology targeted
to transparent SMEs under which the lender depends on hard information in the
form of informative financial statements (i.e., audited financial statements). Asset-
based lending is a transaction-based lending technology that provides working capital
financing to high-risk, opaque SMEs. This technology, which involves intensive daily
monitoring and collateral advances against accounts receivable and inventory, exists 
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Table 1  Lending Technologies
Technology Type Borrower Information
Relationship lending Relationship Opaque Soft
Financial statement lending Transaction Transparent Hard
Asset-based lending Transaction Opaque Hard
Factoring Transaction Opaque Hard
Leasing Transaction Opaque and transparent Hard
Small business credit scoring Transaction  Opaque Hard
Equipment lending Transaction  Opaque and transparent Hard
Real estate-based lending Transaction  Opaque and transparent Hard
Trade credit Transaction  Opaque and transparent Soft and hardin its pure form in only four countries: Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. Factoring and leasing are both transaction technologies that can be
used to finance opaque SMEs and are based on hard information about the underlying
assets purchased by the “lender” (accounts receivable and equipment, respectively).
Small business credit scoring is a relatively new lending technology based on statistical
default models. It is being adopted in many developed economies and is targeted 
to some of the most opaque SMEs, micro businesses. Equipment lending and real
estate-based lending are technologies that can be used to finance opaque SMEs
because underwriting is principally based on the appraised value of the underlying
assets that are pledged as collateral.
2 The final lending technology is trade credit.
3
BU (2006) emphasizes that the feasibility and power of each of these technologies
likely varies significantly across countries depending on each nation’s financial 
institution structure and lending infrastructure. Financial institution structure refers
to the mix of financial institutions and competition among them. Lending infra-
structure refers to the laws, regulations, and conditions that affect the ability of these
institutions to deploy different lending technologies.
4 Some examples illustrate the
importance of these two dimensions. Both theoretical and empirical research indicates
that relationship lending is best delivered by smaller banks (e.g., Stein [2002], Cole,
Goldberg, and White [2004], and Kanoet al. [2006]). Thus, BU (2006) argues that a
country’s ability to mitigate SME financing constraints by deploying relationship
lending may depend crucially on the mix of large and small banks. The feasibility of
other lending technologies is influenced similarly by the national business environ-
ment. The feasibility of asset-based lending, for instance, appears to depend crucially
on one particular element of the lending infrastructure: commercial law on security
interests. The strength of these laws in the four common-law countries may explain
why asset-based lending against accounts receivable and inventory—at least in its 
pure form—is limited to these countries. Likewise, the existence of small business
credit scoring depends crucially on the existence of comprehensive formal third-party
information sharing organizations, either in the form of public credit registries or 
private business credit bureaus (e.g., Dun and Bradstreet).
Our theory of lending channels borrows from the causal link in BU (2006) 
that runs from financial institution structure and lending infrastructure to lending 
technologies to SME credit availability. We define a lending channel as a two-
dimensional conduit that consists of a lending institution on one dimension and 
a lending technology on the other. Thus, each lending channel reflects a unique 
combination of a lending institution and lending technology. The specific number of
lending channels in a financial system will depend on, among other things, a country’s
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2. Here we slightly deviate from BU (2006) in our classification of lending technologies. BU (2006) combines 
equipment lending and real estate-based lending into a single category, fixed-asset lending. In considering the
Japanese banking crisis, we feel it is useful to make a distinction between these two given links between the banking
crisis and the Japanese real estate bubble.
3. For a summary of the literature on the idiosyncratic nature of trade credit, see BU (2006).
4. The financial institution structure has four dimensions: large versus small banks; foreign-owned versus domestically
owned banks; privately owned versus state-owned banks; and the competitive structure of the banking industry.
The lending infrastructure consists of the information environment, the legal, judicial, and bankruptcy environments,
the social environment, and the tax and regulatory environments.financial institution structure and its lending infrastructure. The United States today
may provide the best benchmark example, in part, because all feasible SME lending
technologies exist in economically significant amounts.
Table 2 illustrates our hypothesized existence of lending channels in the U.S. 
context. The rows consist of the same nine lending technologies that are listed in
Table 1. The columns consist of the different types of institutions that deliver one or
more SME lending technologies: large banks, small banks, commercial finance com-
panies, and corporations. The boxes designated “ ” indicate an open lending channel.
We hypothesize the existence today of 19 distinct lending channels in the United
States. For example, as we noted above, theory and empirical evidence suggest that
relationship lending may be exclusively delivered by only one type of institution, small
banks. As a result, the only “open” box in the row for relationship lending is in the
column for small banks.
We use our model of lending channels to assess the effects of financial shocks on
credit availability to SMEs. We hypothesize that different types of financial shocks
may contract one or more of a country’s lending channels. We can use the U.S. credit
crunch during 1990–92 to illustrate how credit availability might have been affected.
A number of different hypotheses about the U.S. credit crunch have been tested with
some evidence supporting each (see, e.g., Berger and Udell [1994]). These include the
introduction of the Basel risk-based capital requirements, the regulatory scrutiny
hypothesis, and the bank capital shock hypothesis. The effects on SME lending 
channels associated with these different hypotheses are illustrated respectively in
Tables 3 to 5. Under the risk-based capital hypothesis, large banks in the U.S. 
contracted lending (which disproportionately affected bank-dependent SMEs) to meet
new Basel I capital adequacy requirements. This is reflected in Table 3 in a contraction
in the six large bank lending channels (“ ” becomes “×”). Under the regulatory
scrutiny hypothesis, bank examiners over-reacted to problems in the banking industry
to avoid a meltdown similar to the savings and loan crises in the 1980s. This resulted
in a contraction of all bank channels as shown in Table 4. Under the bank capital
shock hypothesis, banks that suffered significant loan losses which depleted their 
capital contracted their lending to meet targeted (or regulatory) capital requirements.
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Table 2  U.S. Lending Channels: Normal Times
Commercial 
Large banks Small banks finance Corporations
companies
Relationship lending  
Financial statement lending   
Asset-based lending    
Factoring    
Leasing    
Small business credit scoring   
Equipment lending   
Real estate-based lending   
Trade credit  This likely affected large banks more than small banks, as indicated in Table 5 
with “×” in the large bank lending channels and “ /×” (i.e., mixed) in the small bank
lending channels. It is interesting to note that under any, or all, of these three
hypotheses the commercial finance and trade credit lending channels do not contract.
While this has not been empirically tested, anecdotal evidence is consistent with this.
In particular, industry participants indicate that commercial finance companies
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Table 3  U.S. Lending Channels: Credit Crunch (1990–92)—Risk-Based Capital
Hypothesis
Commercial 
Large banks Small banks finance Corporations
companies
Relationship lending  
Financial statement lending ×  
Asset-based lending ×   
Factoring ×   
Leasing ×   
Equipment lending ×  
Real estate-based lending ×  
Trade credit  
Table 4  U.S. Lending Channels: Credit Crunch (1990–92)—Regulatory Scrutiny
Hypothesis
Commercial 
Large banks Small banks finance Corporations
companies
Relationship lending ×
Financial statement lending ××




Real estate-based lending ××
Trade credit  
Table 5  U.S. Lending Channels: Credit Crunch (1990–92)—Capital Shock Hypothesis
Commercial 
Large banks Small banks finance Corporations
companies
Relationship lending  /×
Financial statement lending ×  /×
Asset-based lending ×  /×  
Factoring ×  /×  
Leasing ×  /×  
Equipment lending ×  /×
Real estate-based lending ×  /×
Trade credit  enjoyed windfall profits during this period.
5 Attempts to verify this, however, are
severely hampered by data limitations.
Turning to the empirical focus of this paper, we are interested in lending channels
in Japan and how they may have behaved during the Japanese banking crisis. We 
begin with a profile of what lending channels likely look like today in Japan, which 
can be viewed in some sense as our “normal period” (Table 6). There are substantial
similarities and some interesting differences between lending channels in Japan and 
the United States. Most of the lending technologies available in the United States are
also available in Japan with one exception, asset-based lending.
6 There are also two
lending technologies uniquely characteristic of Japan: sogo shosha lending, which is
associated with specialized wholesale companies, andkeiretsu/subcontracting lending,
which is associated with the keiretsu. Sogo shosha, which are Japan’s large wholesale
firms, not only extend and receive trade credit but also provide a variety of financial
commitments to their customers in the form of loans, loan guarantees, and other
investments.
7 The former is included in trade credit issued by corporations, while 
the latter is categorized as sogo shosha lending in Table 6. A keiretsu is a vertical 
group of firms (a supply chain with one dominant firm, called a parent firm).
8
For instance, Toyota Motor Corp., as a parent firm, extends and receives trade credit
and provides loans to SMEs that are subcontractors in thekeiretsu relationship with it.
The former is included in trade credit issued by corporations, while the latter is 
categorized as keiretsu/subcontracting lending in Table 6. The biggest differences are 
in the institutions that deliver lending. Particularly different here is the importance 
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Table 6  Japanese Lending Channels: Normal Times
Regional Shinkin Government- Nonbank City banks banks banks affiliated shoko Corporations
banks
1
Relationship lending     
Financial statement lending     
Factoring     
Leasing      
Small business credit scoring  
Equipment lending      
Real estate-based lending      
Trade credit  
Sogo shosha lending  
Keiretsu/subcontracting lending  
Note: 1. In Tables 6 to 11, government-affiliated banks comprise Development Bank of Japan, 
Shoko Chukin Bank, Japan Finance Corporation for Small Business, National Life Finance
Corporation, Okinawa Development Finance Corporation, Housing Loan Corporation and
Agriculture, and Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation.
5. See Udell (2004) for a discussion of the potential role of asset-based lending during the 1990–92 U.S. credit crunch.
6. New Japanese legislation was passed in 2005 on commercial law related to security interests (i.e., collateralization)
on movable assets (i.e., accounts receivable and inventory). This could potentially lead to the introduction of 
asset-based lending into the Japanese SME market.
7. See Uesugi and Yamashiro (2004) for a discussion of sogo shosha lending in Japan.
8. There is another definition of keiretsu: a horizontal group of large firms with major financial institutions at the
core. See Hoshi and Kashap (2001) and Yafeh (2003). Because our focus is SME financing, we adopt the definition
of keiretsu that covers a vertical group of large firms and SMEs connected through a supply chain.of government-affiliated banks and nonbanks including shoko lenders. (Nonbanks 
provide loans but do not take deposits.)Shoko lenders are somewhat analogous to U.S.
independent commercial finance companies, except that they specialize in lending 
to small companies.
9
A number of hypotheses have been formulated to explain the impact of the
Japanese banking crisis on SME lending. Like the United States, Japan implemented
Basel I risk-based capital requirements during the period 1990–92. This hypothesis is
reflected in Table 7 with the impact likely confined to the city banks and some
regional banks.
10 (Note that small business credit scoring did not exist in Japan during
the banking crisis, so it does not appear as a lending technology.) There is also 
evidence that, just as in the United States, shocks to the banking system in Japan (the
capital crunch version of the credit crunch) may have led to a contraction in bank
loan supply during at least some of the bank crisis period (e.g., Woo [1999], Kang 
and Stulz [2000], and Hayashi and Prescott [2002]). This possibility is reflected in
Table 8. Central to our empirical tests is the behavior of the trade credit lending 
channel. This channel may have expanded to offset a contraction in the private 
bank-delivered lending channels. However, the capacity for this channel to fill this 
gap will depend in part on whether the corporations that extend trade credit can 
find additional financing to support their increased receivables. This may have been
problematic for firms that were bank dependent during this period. Evidence from the
United States suggests that large firms are able to increase their extension of trade
credit (i.e., their accounts receivable) in response to monetary shocks by financing this
expansion in the commercial paper market (Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel
[1995]). The ability of large Japanese corporations to access the commercial paper
market or other alternative sources of finance such as loans from foreign banks may
have been limited, particularly early in the banking crisis. 
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Table 7  Japanese Lending Channels: Credit Crunch (1990–92)—Risk-Based Capital
Hypothesis
Regional Shinkin Government- Nonbank City banks banks banks affiliated shoko Corporations
banks
Relationship lending  /×    
Financial statement lending ×  /×   
Factoring ×  /×   
Leasing ×  /×    
Equipment lending ×  /×    
Real estate-based lending ×  /×    
Trade credit  
Sogo shosha lending  
Keiretsu/subcontracting lending  
9. In 2003, the BOJ announced its intention to purchase asset-based securities (ABSs) whose underlying assets are
closely related to SME activity. See Hirata and Shimizu (2004). This could effectively create a new lending channel
that could be added to Table 6.
10. Several regional banks operated internationally during the period 1990–92. They had to meet the Basel I risk-based
capital requirements if they planned to continue their international operations. That is why we put “ /×” (i.e.,
mixed) in the column of regional banks.While these hypotheses are reflected in Tables 7 and 8, it is important to note 
that the regulatory response in Japan appears to have been much different from the
regulatory response during the credit crunch in the United States. While excessive 
regulatory scrutiny of banks may have been a contributing (or at least exacerbat-
ing) factor in the United States, Japanese bank regulation has been moving in the 
opposite direction for at least part of the banking crisis—possibly to avoid exacerbat-
ing a bank credit crunch. Specifically, it has been argued that Japanese bank regulators
under the “convoy system” chose instead to supervise banks in a manner that treated
them more as “providers of public financial services [rather] than competitive private
sector intermediaries where ‘survival of the fittest’ was the underlying principle”
(Nakaso [2001]). This appears to have been associated with a process of encouraging
banks to roll over nonperforming loans (an “evergreen” policy) and even increase their
lending to SMEs, especially after 1998 (Peek and Rosengren [2005] and Caballero,
Hoshi, and Kashyap [2006]).
11 This suggests that the net effect on SMEs may then
vary over the period of the banking crisis and may also vary by bank size and bank
condition. Some researchers have found that instead of provoking a capital crunch,
large banks increased their supply of credit, at least during some periods of the 
crisis, consistent with a moral hazard incentive (Horiuchi and Shimizu [1998] and
Watanabe [2006]).
Another potential hypothesis that may apply to SME lending during this period is
more directly related to one of the key underlying causes of the banking crisis in Japan,
the bursting of the real estate bubble in 1990. This hypothesis, which could be called
the real estate lending hypothesis, argues that there may have been a dampening effect
on the lending channels associated with the real estate-based lending technology as
shown in Table 9. Under this lending technology, commercial loans are primarily
based on recourse against real estate collateral. In SME lending, this can often include
personal real estate hypothecated by the entrepreneur as collateral for commercial loans
11
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Table 8  Japanese Lending Channels: Credit Crunch (1990–2000)—Capital Shock
Hypothesis
Regional Shinkin Government- Nonbank City banks banks banks affiliated shoko Corporations
banks
Relationship lending ××  
Financial statement lending ××× 
Factoring ××× 
Leasing ×××  
Equipment lending ×××  
Real estate-based lending ×××  
Trade credit  /×
Sogo shosha lending  /×
Keiretsu/subcontracting lending  /×
11. Evidence of evergreening has also been found in South Korea during the Asian financial crisis (Park, Shin, and
Udell [2006]).for his/her business. If banks became averse to real estate-based lending because of
falling real estate prices, then this lending channel would have contracted. Interestingly,
however, the evidence suggests the opposite effect. That is, the stock of real estate loans
actually increased both in absolute terms and as a fraction of the total loan portfolio.
This may have been driven by the moral hazard problem as weaker banks sought to
increase their portfolio risk (Iwatsubo [2007]). This finding, though consistent with an
expansion of the bank-delivered real estate-based lending channels, is not sufficient to
prove that these SME lending channels expanded. 
In great part, the extent to which these hypotheses explain bank commercial 
lending during the banking crisis in Japan is still an open question. Viewed through the
prism of our lending channel paradigm, the answer in part will depend on the extent
to which one or more lending channels contracted and the extent to which other 
lending channels were able to offset any negative effect by expanding. Data availability
problems likely preclude a comprehensive test of the behavior of each individual 
lending channel during the crisis. However, data do permit a partial examination 
that focuses on one potentially important channel, trade credit. In the next section, 
we discuss the importance of trade credit in Japan and elsewhere and outline how we
conduct our analysis.
Before turning to our analysis of trade credit and its potential behavior during 
the banking crisis, we note how our lending channel paradigm can be used to assess
the impact of another type financial “shock”: shifts in monetary policy. Table 10 
illustrates how a tightening of monetary policy might affect lending channels in Japan
today. As with the case of the banking crisis credit crunch hypotheses, the net effect 
of a monetary policy shock will depend on the extent to which expansion of the 
unaffected channels (the nonbank channels here) can offset the affected channels 
(the bank channels here). 
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Table 9  Japanese Lending Channels: Credit Crunch (1990–2000)—Real Estate
Lending Channel
Regional Shinkin Government- Nonbank City banks banks banks affiliated shoko Corporations
banks
Relationship lending     
Financial statement lending     
Factoring     
Leasing      
Equipment lending      
Real estate-based lending ×××××
Trade credit  
Sogo shosha lending  
Keiretsu/subcontracting lending  III. Lending Channels during the Japanese Banking Crisis: 
The Case of Trade Credit
If a credit crunch occurred during at least part of the Japanese banking crisis, our
lending channel paradigm suggests that its net effect on credit availability would be
determined by the extent to which the contraction of some lending channels was 
offset by the expansion of others. The existence of a credit crunch, however, is still an
open research question. There are several related issues. Did some financial institutions
contract their supply of lending during a fraction of the crisis period, contracting 
or shutting down some of the lending channels? Did the “convoy system” of bank
prudential supervision and any associated “evergreen” policy work in the opposite
direction of a credit crunch? Did moral hazard-driven behavior mitigate an SME
credit crunch, with some banks increasing their supply of SME lending, and expand-
ing some lending channels, consistent with empirical and theoretical work on bank
risk-taking and capital shocks?
12 While our empirical analysis is related to all of these
questions, our objective is much more focused. We simply ask the following question:
if a contraction of some of the lending channels occurred during any fraction of the
banking crisis, was this offset by an expansion of other lending channels?
Testing the behavior of lending channels during any financial shock is quite prob-
lematic because of data limitations. For example, the literature on SME lending 
has identified relationship lending as a very important source of SME financing in
developed and developing economies. This literature has also associated relationship
lending with smaller financial intermediaries. However, due to data limitations it is very
difficult to isolate the relationship lending channel during the Japanese banking crisis.
For example, without data that can distinguish between lending by smaller banks using
13
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Table 10  Japanese Lending Channels: Monetary Policy—Today (Tight Money)
Regional Shinkin Government- Nonbank City banks banks banks affiliated shoko Corporations
banks
Relationship lending ××  
Financial statement lending ××× 
Factoring ××× 
Leasing ×××  
Small business credit scoring ×
Equipment lending ×××  
Real estate-based lending ×××  
Trade credit  
Sogo shosha lending  
Keiretsu/subcontracting lending  
12. The theoretical and empirical literature on this issue offers mixed results. See Iwatsubo (2007) for a discussion of
this literature.the relationship lending technology and lending by smaller banks using other lending
technologies (i.e., financial statement lending, leasing, factoring, equipment lending,
real estate-based lending), it may be quite difficult to assess the impact of a contraction
of the relationship lending channel on SME credit availability during either the
Japanese banking crisis or the U.S. credit crunch.
13 However, data on one lending 
channel during the Japanese banking crisis offer a window for analysis and a partial 
test of the lending channel paradigm—data on trade credit. In this section, we outline
our hypothesis on the behavior of the trade credit lending channel during the banking
crisis, preceded by a review of the literature on trade credit. 
Table 11 illustrates our basic empirical strategy. As we will discuss in our next 
section, our primary data consist of aggregate firm balance sheets. As a result, we 
can only identify broad categories of lending channels, with one important exception.
The key exception is trade credit, the focus of our analysis. Specifically, our data
enable us to isolate the Japanese trade credit lending channel: trade credit provided 
by corporations designated as the “t” channel in Table 11.
Our data do not enable us to distinguish among all of the different bank lending
channels. We only know the aggregate amount that firms borrow from banks and 
nonbank financial institutions. Thus, we group the bank lending channels (channel
“b”) and the nonbank lending channels (channel “n”) together, and we will refer to
them as the financial institution lending channels. Sogo shosha lending is excluded
from our analysis due to data limitations. Our empirical tests then examine whether
the allocation of credit changed between the financial institution channels and the
trade credit channel. If, for example, a bank credit crunch occurred during some or all
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13. A recent study of four countries during the Asian financial crisis found evidence that relationship lending in general
mitigated credit access problems in South Korea and Thailand, but not in Indonesia and the Philippines.
Specifically, in the former two countries it found that stronger banking relationships were associated with credit
availability. See Jiangli, Unal, and Yom (2005).
Table 11  Japanese Lending Channels: Our Analysis
Regional Shinkin Government- Nonbank City banks banks banks affiliated shoko Corporations
banks
Relationship lending b b b
Financial statement lending bbbbn
Factoring bbbb
Leasing bbbbn
Real estate-based lending bbbbn
Trade credit t
Sogo shosha lending s
Keiretsu/subcontracting lending k
bnt
Our analysis: (bank vs. (nonbank  vs. (trade
loans) shoko) credit)
Note: The sogo shosha lending channel, s, and thekeiretsu/subcontracting lending channel,k, are
excluded from the analysis.of the crisis, we might expect to see a relative contraction of the financial institution
lending channels and relative expansion of the trade credit channel. This would be
consistent with the behavior of trade credit in response to financial shocks identified in
the literature on trade in the United States (Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel
[1995]). Our analysis, however, will not be able to detect a change in the mix between
the individual lending channels within the group of financial institution lending 
channels. For example, we would not be able to detect a contraction of the city bank
channel relative to the regional bank channel.
Before turning to our empirical analysis, we offer a brief review of the literature 
on trade credit, given its prominence in our analysis and its importance in Japanese
financial system architecture. Trade credit in Japan today represents 22.67 percent 
of all debt extended to nonfarm, nonfinancial, non-real estate, for-profit firms and
23.67 percent of all debt extended to nonfarm, nonfinancial, non-real estate, for-profit
SMEs. This compares to 33.56 percent and 38.81 percent, respectively, of debt 
provided by banks. By way of comparison, trade credit in the United States is about
one-third of all debt extended to nonfarm, nonfinancial, non-real estate, for-profit 
U.S. SMEs, which is only slightly less than the fraction extended by commercial banks
(Robb [2002]). More generally, the level of trade credit in Japan is among the highest
in developed economies (Kneeshaw [1995]). Trade credit may be even more important
in economies with weak financial systems, where industries with higher dependence 
on trade credit exhibit higher growth rates (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic [2002]
and Fisman and Love [2003]).
In Table 1, we classified trade credit as primarily a transaction technology. This
would be justified to the extent that trade credit decisions are made on hard infor-
mation culled by suppliers about payment performance, customer financial conditions,
and buyer industry performance. However, we note that vendor-customer relationships
may play an important role and thus soft information may also be important—also
indicated in Table 1. The literature on trade credit, however, offers many different 
theories and evidence on trade credit.
This literature has suggested that trade creditors may have a comparative advantage
over other types of lenders. Typically, these advantages are either related to market
structure or product characteristics. More specifically, these theories of trade credit
have identified potential advantages in funding, production/inventory management,
price discrimination, and product quality guarantees. Some studies find that product
sellers may have an informational advantage over other types of lenders in assessing the
customer’s ability to pay, solving incentive problems, repossessing and reselling goods
in the event of default, or withholding future supplies (see Petersen and Rajan [1997],
Burkart, Ellingsen, and Giannetti [2004], and Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe [2006]
for summaries of these theories and related empirical evidence). Other recent work has
suggested that trade creditors may have a comparative advantage, because firms may 
be less inclined to strategically default on trade credit than bank credit (Cunat [2007]
and Burkart and Ellingsen [2004]). It has been argued theoretically and empirically
that if vendors have an informational advantage over banks and other types of lenders,
and if they have an automatic collateral priority under local commercial law, then a
greater amount of trade credit will be used by less creditworthy companies than more
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should be noted, however, that countries vary in terms of whether (and the extent to
which) trade creditors have any automatic collateral priority. In addition, there is some
evidence that the amount of trade credit is related to the type of product sold: specifically,
more trade credit is extended when a product is not standardized and thus less divertible
(Burkart, Ellingsen, and Giannetti [2004]).
Some papers have argued that trade creditors may be relationship lenders that 
produce private soft information about their borrower to make credit decisions (e.g.,
Mian and Smith [1992], Biais and Gollier [1997], Jain [2001], Cunat [2007], Miwa
and Ramseyer [2005], Fabri and Menichini [2006], and Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe
[2006]). It is possible that this soft information may differ from the soft information
generated by banking relationships (Biais and Gollier [1997]).
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A number of papers have examined whether trade credit and commercial loans are 
substitutes or complements of one another. Most empirical literature finds that they 
are substitutes (Meltzer [1960], Brechling and Lipsey [1963], Jaffee [1968], Ramey
[1992], Marotta [1996], Tsuruta [2003], and Uesugi and Yamashiro [2004]). However,
some of the empirical literature has found that they are complements in developing
economies (Cook [1999]) and Japan (Ono [2001]).
Many papers have assumed that trade credit is more expensive than bank loans,
with many arguing that it is considerably more expensive (e.g., Elliehausen and
Wolken [1993], Petersen and Rajan [1994, 1995, 1997], Hernández de Cos and
Hernando [1998], and Danielson and Scott [2000]). This assumption has been quite
useful in the literature on evaluating credit constraints in SMEs, because it allows
researchers to use dependence on trade credit as a proxy for the degree of financial
constraints. This view of trade credit as the most expensive source of credit (or one of
the most expensive), however, is not without its critics. Typically, the cost of trade
credit is estimated in a mechanical way that assumes a standard pricing which has a
discount for early payment and a final maturity. If these terms are a 2 percent discount
in 10 days and net (i.e., maturity) of 30 days, then this implies an annual rate of
nearly 40 percent. Critics argue, however, that the stated terms vary considerably.
More importantly, the stated terms such as maturity are likely very different from 
the actual terms. Equally important, one additional element in the pricing menu 
is generally unknown to the researcher—the price of the underlying product. Thus,
critics argue that if these factors were known it is likely that the estimates of the cost of
trade credit would not indicate it is more expensive than bank loans (Miwa and
Ramseyer [2005]). 
The closest papers to our empirical analysis are Ono (2001), Ogawa (2003), Uesugi
(2005), and Fukuda, Kasuya, and Akashi (2006). They all investigate empirically
whether trade credit and financial institution lending are complements or substitutes
in Japan, while the results are mixed. Important differences between these papers and
our empirical analysis are as follows. Ono (2001) and Ogawa (2003) do not include
the non-manufacturing sector in their empirical analysis or pay special attention to 
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14. One paper specifically tests the link between the strength of the trade credit relationship and the quantity of 
trade credit. It finds evidence for Japanese SMEs that stronger trade credit relationships lead to more trade credit
consistent with the hypothesis that trade creditors are relationship lenders. See Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2006).the credit crunch periods, while we do both. Besides investigating the credit crunch
periods, it turns out that it is important to include the non-manufacturing sector in 
the empirical analysis, because there is an important difference between it and the 
manufacturing sector in terms of trade credit and financial institution lending, as 
will be discussed below. Uesugi (2005) and Fukuda, Kasuya, and Akashi (2006) 
concentrate their empirical analysis on relatively short periods: the former covers
1997–2002 and the latter covers 2001–03. In contrast, our empirical analysis covers
much longer periods than those two papers, as will be explained in the next section. 
It is important for our purpose to cover longer periods, because we investigate 
whether or not and how the relation between the trade credit channel and the 
financial institution lending channel during the credit crunch period differs from 
that during other periods.
IV. The Specification and the Data
As we noted in the previous section, our empirical approach in this paper is to investi-
gate the impact of the Japanese banking crises on the trade credit lending channel. 
More specifically, we investigate whether the trade credit channel expanded during 
the crises—or during sub-periods in the crisis—when we suspect that the financial
institution lending channel may have contracted. We do this by analyzing both the
lending and borrowing sides of trade credit. The lending side of trade credit is reflected
in the accounts receivable on firm balance sheets,
15 and the borrowing side is reflected
in the accounts payable on firm balance sheets. 
This section introduces the data that we use and specifies the linear regressions. The
Japanese Ministry of Finance compiles Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations
by Industry (FSSC) to survey the balance sheets and income statements of nonfinancial
private corporations. We use these data for balance-sheet information including
accounts receivable and accounts payable. The Bank of Japan compiles Short-Term
Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan (called the Tankan) to assess the current 
conditions at the industry level of the domestic economy on a quarterly basis. The
FSSC and the Tankan are our main data sources. The FSSC and the Tankan divide 
sample firms by size of capital stock and industry. Here we explain in detail how 
sample firms are divided.
A. Division of Firms by Size of Capital Stock
In terms of size of capital stock, both the FSSC and theTankan divide firms into three
categories: “large” firms (¥1 billion or more), “medium-sized” firms (¥100 million up
to ¥1 billion), and “small” firms (¥10 million up to ¥100 million).
16 We will exploit
these size categories to isolate SMEs and explore potential differential effects on the
lending and borrowing size.
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15. See the Appendix, Section A.2, for further details.
16. Actually the FSSC divides firms into more refined categories (five categories) as well as three categories in terms 
of firm size. However, the Tankan divides firms into just three categories. To match the data in the FSSC and 
theTankan, we use the three-category division in the FSSC.B. Division of Firms by Industry
Both the Tankan and the FSSC divide firms into refined industries in each of the 
manufacturing sector and the non-manufacturing sector (e.g., food & beverages, 
textiles, construction, wholesaling, and so on). Using the Tankan and the FSSC, we
construct our dataset as follows. First, we match industries in the FSSC to those in 
theTankan. If we cannot match an industry because the industry is missing in either
of the Tankan or the FSSC, we drop the industry from our dataset. Furthermore, 
we drop any industry if the number of observations in the industry is fewer than 10.
Second, we adjust the data discontinuity of medium-sized firms and small firms in 
the FSSC.
17 As a result, our dataset consists of 22 industries that are listed in Table 12.
The minimum number of observations in an industry is 49, while the maximum is 
150. The average number of observations per industry is 112.62. 
C. Specification
The following is the basic specification for h-size firms (h = large, medium, small) to
determine trade receivables per sales, trade payables per short-term financial institution
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17. The way to adjust the discontinuity is slightly different across medium-sized firms and small firms. That is why 
the end of sample period is different across medium-sized firms and small firms in the same industry after the
adjustment. See the Appendix for details of the discontinuity adjustment. Furthermore, the start of sample period
is sometimes different across large, medium-sized, and small firms even in the same industry in the FSSC.




Food & beverages 1974/Q2–2005/Q4 1974/Q2–2005/Q1 1967/Q3–2004/Q4
Textiles 1974/Q2–2005/Q4 1974/Q2–2005/Q1 1967/Q3–2004/Q4
Lumber & wood products 1975/Q3–2005/Q4 1975/Q3–2005/Q1 1975/Q3–2004/Q4
Pulp & paper 1974/Q2–2005/Q4 1974/Q2–2005/Q1 1967/Q3–2004/Q4
Chemicals 1974/Q2–2005/Q4 1974/Q2–2005/Q1 1967/Q3–2004/Q4
Petroleum & coal products 1975/Q3–2005/Q4 1975/Q3–2005/Q1 1975/Q3–2004/Q4
Ceramics, stone & clay 1975/Q3–2005/Q4 1975/Q3–2005/Q1 1975/Q3–2004/Q4
Iron & steel 1974/Q2–2005/Q4 1974/Q2–2005/Q1 1967/Q3–2004/Q4
Nonferrous metals 1974/Q2–2005/Q4 1974/Q2–2005/Q1 1974/Q3–2004/Q4
Processed metals 1974/Q2–2005/Q4 1974/Q2–2005/Q1 1967/Q3–2004/Q4
Industrial machinery 1974/Q2–2005/Q4 1974/Q2–2005/Q1 1967/Q3–2004/Q4
Electrical machinery 1974/Q2–2005/Q4 1974/Q2–2005/Q1 1967/Q3–2004/Q4
Motor vehicles 1992/Q4–2005/Q4 1992/Q4–2005/Q1 1992/Q4–2004/Q4
Precision machinery 1975/Q3–2005/Q4 1975/Q3–2005/Q1 1975/Q3–2004/Q4
Other manufacturing 1974/Q2–2005/Q4 1974/Q2–2005/Q1 1967/Q3–2004/Q4
Mining 1983/Q2–2005/Q4 1983/Q2–2005/Q1 1983/Q2–2004/Q4
Construction 1983/Q2–2005/Q4 1983/Q2–2005/Q1 1983/Q2–2004/Q4
Transportation 1983/Q2–2005/Q4 1983/Q2–2005/Q1 1983/Q2–2004/Q4
Wholesaling 1983/Q2–2005/Q4 1983/Q2–2005/Q1 1983/Q2–2004/Q4
Retailing 1983/Q2–2005/Q4 1983/Q2–2005/Q1 1983/Q2–2004/Q4
Real estate 1983/Q2–2005/Q4 1983/Q2–2005/Q1 1983/Q2–2004/Q4
Services 1983/Q2–2005/Q4 1983/Q2–2005/Q1 1983/Q2–2004/Q4borrowing, trade payables, or short-term financial institution borrowing in industry i
during time periodt.
Deph,i,t
=   h,i,t + i + h,i,t
=  0 + 1Tankanlarge,i,t + 2Tankanmedium,i,t + 3Tankansmall,i,t + 4Bubble_Dummy
+ 5CP_Dummy + 6Crunch_Dummy1 + 7Crunch_Dummy2
+ 8Crunch_Dummy3 + 9(Invlarge,i,t−1/Saleslarge,i,t) + 10(Invmedium,i,t−1/Salesmedium,i,t) 
+ 11(Invsmall,i,t−1/Salessmall,i,t) + 12Leveragelarge,i,t−1 + 13Leveragemedium,i,t−1
+ 14Leveragesmall,i,t−1 + 15(Cash_Flowlarge,i,t/Saleslarge,i,t) 
+ 16(Cash_Flowmedium,i,t/Salesmedium,i,t) + 17(Cash_Flowsmall,i,t/Salessmall,i,t) 
+ 18Trendt + 19ST_Ratet + 20LT_Ratet + 21Unemployment_Ratet
+ 22Growth_Ratet + 23Q2_Dummy + 24Q3_Dummy
+ 25Q4_Dummy + i +  h,i,t.
The description of variables is in Table 13.Deph,i,t is the dependent variable:TRh,i,t/Salesh,i,t,
TPh,i,t/ST_Borrowingh,i,t, TPh,i,t, or ST_Borrowingh,i,t.   is a coefficient matrix,  h,i,t is 
a matrix of explanatory variables,  i is the industry-specific residual, and  h,i,t is the 
residual with the usual properties (mean zero, serially uncorrelated, uncorrelated 
with  h,i,t, uncorrelated with  i, and homoskedastic). Our first two dependent 
variables, respectively, are measures of the quantity of trade credit supplied expressed 
as a turnover ratio and the quantity of trade credit demanded expressed as fraction 
of short-term financial institution borrowing. We also use trade payables and the 
short-term borrowing, respectively, for the dependent variables to see how each of 
these behaves in the sample period. We assume  i to be random effects.
18 Since the 
cash flow may be endogenous, we use the lagged cash flow (Cash_Flowh,i,t−1/Salesh,i,t−1)
as instrument variables.
We will also try the “parsimonious” specification for trade payables per short-term
financial institution borrowing, trade payables, and short-term financial institution
borrowing as follows.
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18. We have conducted fixed effects regression as well as random effects regression. By running a Hausman test, we
have chosen random effects regression.Deph,i,t
= 0 + 1Tankanh,i,t + 2Bubble_Dummy + 3CP_Dummy
+ 4Crunch_Dummy1 + 5Crunch_Dummy2 + 6Crunch_Dummy3
+ 7(Invh,i,t−1/Salesh,i,t) + 8Leverageh,i,t−1 + 9(Cash_Flowh,i,t/Salesh,i,t)
+ 10Trendt + 11ST_Ratet + 12LT_Ratet + 13Unemployment_Ratet
+ 14Growth_Ratet + 15Q2_Dummy + 16Q3_Dummy
+ 17Q4_Dummy + i +  h,i,t.
The variables in   include a number of variables that control for economic condi-
tions, including GDP growth and unemployment. We explain some of the variables
in more detail.
Our key explanatory variables are our “crunch” dummies and ourTankan variables.
We test the hypothesis that some lending channels may have expanded during the
Japanese banking crisis in response to the contraction of other lending channels.
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Table 13  Variables forh-Size Firms in Industryi (h = Large; Medium; Small)
Variable Description
TRh,i,t Trade receivables ofh-size firms in industryi at the end of timet
Salesh,i,t Sales ofh-size firms in industryi during timet
TPh,i,t Trade payables ofh-size firms in industryi at the end of timet
ST_Borrowingh,i,t Short-term financial institution borrowing ofh-size firms in industryi at the 
end of timet
Tankanh,i,t Diffusion index for lending attitude of financial institutions forh-size firms in 
industryi at timet
Bubble_Dummy 1 in 1987/Q1–1990/Q4, 0 otherwise
CP_Dummy 1 from 1987/Q4 onward, 0 otherwise
Crunch_Dummy1 1 in 1990/Q1–1992/Q4, 0 otherwise
Crunch_Dummy2 1 in 1994/Q3–1996/Q4, 0 otherwise
Crunch_Dummy3 1 in 1997/Q3–1999/Q1, 0 otherwise
Invh,i,t –1 Inventories ofh-size firms in industryi at the end of timet–1
Leverageh,i,t –1 Ratio of total liabilities to total assets ofh-size firms in industryi at the end of 
timet–1
Trendh,i,t Trend
ST_Ratet Short-term interest rate at timet
LT_Ratet Long-term interest rate at timet
Unemployment_Ratet Unemployment rate at timet
Growth_Ratet GDP growth rate at timet (percent change from the previous year)
Q2_Dummy 1 in Q2, 0 otherwise
Q3_Dummy 1 in Q3, 0 otherwise
Q4_Dummy 1 in Q4, 0 otherwiseSpecifically, we investigate whether SMEs used more trade credit during periods where
financial institutions may have contracted their supply of credit, thus contracting their
lending channels. We also investigate whether other companies lent more trade credit
during this period. Our crunch dummies identify periods where, if there was any 
contraction of financial institution lending, it likely occurred. We useCrunch_Dummy1
to capture the implementation period of the Basel I risk-based capital requirements
(1990/Q1–1992/Q4). There is evidence that in some countries this may have been
associated with a contraction in the supply of bank credit (e.g., Haubrich and Wachtel
[1993], Berger and Udell [1994], Hancock and Wilcox [1994a, b], and Wagster
[1999]).
19Crunch_Dummy2 is used to capture the period when many financial institu-
tions were in deepest trouble (1994/Q3–1996/Q4). Five deposit-taking institutions
failed during this period (Tokyo Kyowa Credit Cooperative, Anzen Credit Cooperative,
Cosmo Credit Cooperative, Kizu Credit Cooperative, and Hyogo Bank). Daiwa Bank
was ordered by the U.S. regulators to close all operations in the U.S. markets, since 
it had incurred a loss of approximately US$1.1 billion as a result of the fraudulent 
conduct of an employee at its New York branch. In addition, the aggregate loss of 
seven non-banks (the so-called jusen housing loan companies) was found to be 
¥6,410 billion. Crunch_Dummy3 is used to capture the period (1997/Q3–1999/Q1)
when even larger financial institutions failed (Nippon Credit Bank, Sanyo Securities,
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Yamaichi Securities, and Tokuyo City Bank). 
Our Tankan variables are also used to identify a contraction in the supply of 
financial institution credit. Specifically,Tankanh,i,t is the diffusion index for the lending
attitude of financial institutions for h-size firms in industry i at time t.
20 The larger
Tankanh,i,t is, the more willing financial institutions are to lend to h-size firms in 
industryi at timet.
Bubble_Dummy is used to capture the period when Japan experienced the so-called
bubble economy (1987/Q1–1990/Q4).
21 During the bubble period, financial institu-
tion lending increased substantially. If trade credit and financial institution lending are
substitutes (complements), trade credit may decrease (increase) during the bubble
period. CP_Dummy captures the fact that the commercial paper market was created 
in 1987/Q4 in Japan, which might affect the behavior of trade credit issuers or 
borrowers thereafter. In particular, this may capture any effect driven by larger firms 
issuing commercial paper to finance more trade credit, in other words, funding more
accounts receivable (Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel [1995]).
Invh,i,t−1/Salesh,i,t captures a possible role of inventories as collateral for trade credit
and short-term borrowing. Trade receivables, trade payables, and short-term borrow-
ing may increase if the inventories serve as collateral for them. Leverageh,i,t−1, the 
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19. Some researchers have found that Basel may have had a more complicated effect in Japan, where international
banks appear to be sensitive to capital constraints under Basel while domestic banks appear not to have been
affected by the accord. Consistent with the moral hazard finding, this same research also suggests the possibility
that in addition to a general sensitivity to capital constraints, international Japanese banks may have had an 
incentive to switch from low risk to high riskwithin their portfolios (Montgomery [2005]). This is also consistent
with other research that poorly capitalized banks in Japan tended to misallocate their loan portfolios to troubled 
borrowers (Peek and Rosengren [2005]). The implication here for viable SMEs may be negative. 
20. See the Appendix, Section B, for the construction of the diffusion index.
21. See Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001) for a discussion of the definition of the bubble period in Japan.leverage ratio, is included to control for the balance-sheet condition of the firms.
Cash_Flowh,i,t/Salesh,i,t is included because firms use internally generated cash as a 
primary financial resource. If the firms have plenty of cash, they do not need to 
borrow externally. Thus, firms may extend trade payables and short-term borrowing
when their cash flow decreases. 
ST_Ratet, LT_Ratet, Unemployment_Ratet, and Growth_Ratet are included to control
for macroeconomic conditions. Trendt, Q2_Dummy, Q3_Dummy, and Q4_Dummy
are included for trend removal and seasonal adjustment.
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V. Empirical Results
In this section, we report the empirical results. In Section V.A, we explain an important
heterogeneity across industries and firm size as well as its implication for the literature.
In Section V.B, we report the results of the trade receivables (per sales) regression. 
In Section V.C, we report the results of the trade payables per short-term financial 
institution borrowing regression, the trade payable regression, and the short-term
financial institution borrowing regression.
A. Heterogeneity across Industries and Firm Sizes
We begin by explaining our motivation for using disaggregated data to take into
account any heterogeneity across different groups (industries and firm sizes). To see
whether there is a non-negligible heterogeneity across different groups, we estimate 
the parsimonious specification model using the short-term financial institution 
borrowing as the dependent variable, group by group. We report the sign of the 
estimated coefficient on the Tankan index and its significance in Table 14 (see also
Tables 15 and 16). Clearly there exists an important heterogeneity across different
groups. In some industries and firm sizes, the estimated coefficient on theTankan index
is negative rather than positive, meaning that those firms reduce their short-term 
borrowing when financial institutions become more willing to lend. Overall, the firms
in the manufacturing sector tend to increase the short-term borrowing while those in
the non-manufacturing sector tend to decrease it, when the financial institutions 
become more willing to lend.
23 If we aggregate both the manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing sectors, we may miss some important information, because the 
behavior in the manufacturing sector and that in the non-manufacturing sector may 
be canceled out. Therefore, we use a subsample that includes only industries in 
the manufacturing sector and a subsample that includes only industries in the 
non-manufacturing sector, respectively, for estimation of the random effect model. 
We also estimate the random effect model using all industries in the manufacturing 
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22. See Goldberger (1991, pp. 185–189) for trend removal and seasonal adjustment.
23. Some readers might suspect that the firms in the non-manufacturing sector reduce their short-term borrowing 
but increase their long-term borrowing when the financial institutions become more willing to lend. To explore
this possibility, we use the long-term financial institution borrowing or the sum of short- and long-term financial
institution borrowing in place of the short-term financial institution borrowing in the estimation. We obtain 
similar results to those obtained from the estimation using the short-term financial institution borrowings. 
See Tables 15 and 16.23
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Table 14  Effect of theTankan Index on the Level of Short-Term Borrowing
Industry Large Medium Small
Food & beverages +*** +*** +
Textiles +*** +*** –
Lumber & wood products + + +**
Pulp & paper +*** +* –
Chemicals + +*** –
Petroleum & coal products +** + –
Ceramics, stone & clay + + +**
Iron & steel + + +*
Nonferrous metals +*** +*** +**
Processed metals +*** +*** +***
Industrial machinery + + –
Electrical machinery + +*** +**
Motor vehicles – +** –
Precision machinery – +*** –***
Other manufacturing – + +
Mining – – +**
Construction – – –
Transportation – + –
Wholesaling – + –
Retailing –*** + –*
Real estate + –** –
Services – – –
Note: *** denotes significant at 1 percent, ** denotes significant at 5 percent, and * denotes significant
at 10 percent.
Table 15  Effect of theTankan Index on the Level of Long-Term Borrowing
Industry Large Medium Small
Food & beverages –*** – –
Textiles + + –
Lumber & wood products + + –
Pulp & paper – – –***
Chemicals –* + +
Petroleum & coal products +*** – –
Ceramics, stone & clay – – +
Iron & steel +*** – –
Nonferrous metals –*** + –
Processed metals + – –**
Industrial machinery + – –
Electrical machinery –* +*** –
Motor vehicles – – –
Precision machinery – + –
Other manufacturing –** – –*
Mining + + +
Construction + – –
Transportation –** – –***
Wholesaling – – –
Retailing –*** – –***
Real estate – – –
Services – – –
Note: *** denotes significant at 1 percent, ** denotes significant at 5 percent, and * denotes significant
at 10 percent.sector and the non-manufacturing sector to see how the dependent variable behaves at
the aggregate level.
24
The negative effect of the Tankan index on financial institution borrowing has
important implications for the literature. First, it has an important implication for 
the debate on whether trade credit and financial institution borrowing are substitutes
or complements. The literature argues that trade credit and financial institution 
borrowing are complements if trade credit increases when financial institutions 
become more willing to lend.
25 An implicit assumption behind this argument is that
the firms increase their short-term borrowing when financial institutions become 
more willing to lend (i.e., the effect of the Tankan index on financial institution 
borrowing is assumed to be positive). But if this assumption fails in some industries 
and firm sizes, as is found here, trade credit and financial institution borrowing 
may not be complements even if trade credit increases when financial institutions
24 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/NOVEMBER 2007
Table 16  Effect of theTankan Index on the Level of Short-Term and Long-Term Borrowing
Industry Large Medium Small
Food & beverages + +** –
Textiles +*** +*** –
Lumber & wood products + + +
Pulp & paper +* + –*
Chemicals – +*** +
Petroleum & coal products +*** + –
Ceramics, stone & clay + + +
Iron & steel +** – +
Nonferrous metals +*** +*** +
Processed metals +*** + –
Industrial machinery + + –
Electrical machinery + +*** +
Motor vehicles – + –
Precision machinery – +** –**
Other manufacturing – + –
Mining – – +**
Construction – – –
Transportation –* + –***
Wholesaling – – –
Retailing –*** – –***
Real estate – –* –
Services – – –
Note: *** denotes significant at 1 percent, ** denotes significant at 5 percent, and * denotes significant
at 10 percent.
24. The usual random effect model assumes the heterogeneity across different groups in terms of the constant term
(industry-specific residual) in the regression. The heterogeneity we find here is beyond just the constant term,
because this suggests different groups react in the opposite direction when the lending willingness of financial
institutions changes. That is why we separate the manufacturing sector and the non-manufacturing sector for the
given-sized firms first. Then we apply the random effect model for each sector, assuming there is no difference
across industries within the same sector except for the difference in the constant term. We also estimate the 
random effect model by using all industries in both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, to see
which sector’s behavior dominates when the two sectors’ behavior differs.
25. See Ono (2001) and Ogawa (2003).become more willing to lend if financial institution borrowing does not concomitantly
increase. Second, the heterogeneity above implies that there is a reallocation of finan-
cial institution lending across industries and firm sizes. Put another way, the volume 
of lending does not always uniformly change across industries and firm sizes when 
the willingness of financial institutions to lend changes. When financial institutions
become more (or less) willing to lend, some reallocation of financial institution 
lending occurs across industries and firm sizes: lending may increase in some industries
and firm sizes, while it may decrease in others. Further investigation of this reallocation
may be worthwhile.
B. Trade Receivables
We begin by examining whether companies in different size categories increased their
supply of trade credit. Our empirical results in Table 17 show how much in trade 
receivables (per sales) h-size firms would issue conditional on   (h = large, medium,
small), in other words, how much trade credit h-size firms would provide conditional
on  . However, they do not show to whom h-size firms provide trade credit, because
we cannot identify who receives the credit provided by h-size firms in our data.
Because all large, medium-sized, and small firms can potentially receive the trade
credit, we include all Tankan variables, Tankanlarge,i,t, Tankanmedium,i,t, and Tankansmall,i,t, in
our estimation.
Large and small firms issue more trade receivables when financial institutions are
more willing to lend to medium-sized firms. This means that the trade credit channel
and financial institution lending channels are complements, rather than substitutes,if
medium-sized firms receive more trade credit as well as borrow more from financial
institutions in such a situation. However, from the data it is not clear who receives
trade credit. Thus, we cannot be sure whether or not the results actually indicate that
trade credit and financial institution lending are complements. Most coefficients on
the crunch dummy are positive and 13 out of 27 are significantly positive, meaning
that firms provide more trade credit during credit crunch periods. This would be 
generally consistent with an expansion of the trade credit channel that provides SME
financing when there is a contraction in the bank lending channels. In contrast to the
crunch dummy, most coefficients on the bubble dummy are negative, implying a 
contraction of the trade credit channel during the bubble period. This suggests that
the trade credit channel and the financial institution lending channel are substitutes
during the bubble period, given the fact of an expansion of the financial institution
lending channel during the same period, as will be confirmed below.
One other interesting finding in the receivables regression is the positive and 
significant coefficient on the commercial paper dummy, CP_Dummy. This indicates
that the introduction of commercial paper was associated with more extension of
trade credit in general. This is consistent with the possibility that large firm access to
the short-term capital markets allows them to extend more trade credit consistent
with findings in the United States (Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel [1995]).
25













































Table 17  Trade Receivables/Sales
Independent
Large Medium Small
variable All Manufacturing Non- All Manufacturing Non- All Manufacturing Non-
manufacturing manufacturing manufacturing
Tankanlarge 0.000 –0.001** 0.010*** 0.000 0.000 0.002 –0.001*** –0.002*** –0.004***
Tankanmedium 0.001*** –0.001 0.006*** 0.000 –0.002*** 0.007*** 0.001*** –0.001 0.008***
Tankansmall 0.000 0.001 –0.005*** –0.001** 0.002*** –0.005*** 0.000 0.002*** –0.002***
Bubble_Dummy –0.013 –0.027 0.065 –0.044*** –0.025 –0.070 0.004 –0.005 –0.035
CP_Dummy 0.081** –0.062 0.263** 0.035 0.008 0.028 0.023 –0.054* 0.112**
Crunch_Dummy1 0.054** 0.053* 0.155 0.044*** 0.046* 0.100 0.041*** 0.047* 0.063
Crunch_Dummy2 0.013 0.041* –0.164** 0.038*** 0.055*** –0.017 0.058*** 0.072*** 0.029
Crunch_Dummy3 0.027 0.026 0.247*** 0.024 0.021 0.208*** –0.001 –0.009 0.063
Invlarge,i,t–1 0.203*** 0.108*** 0.231*** 0.052*** 0.033 –0.103** –0.005 0.071** –0.154***
Invmedium,i,t–1 –0.116*** 0.718*** –0.150** 0.107*** 0.860*** 0.082* –0.028* 0.485*** 0.058*
Invsmall,i,t–1 –0.031 0.481*** –0.190*** 0.000 0.388*** –0.006 0.072*** 0.484*** 0.078***
Leveragelarge,i,t–1 1.735*** 0.213** 3.987*** –0.100 0.649*** 1.214*** 0.042 0.546*** 0.113
Leveragemedium,i,t–1 0.584*** 0.112 1.987*** –0.013 0.254* –0.547 –0.059 0.297** –0.062
Leveragesmall,i,t–1 –0.092 0.764*** –2.145*** –0.098 1.112*** –1.839*** 0.026 0.594*** –0.975***
Cash_Flowlarge,i,t 6.837*** 4.220*** 5.285*** 1.109** 4.084*** 0.354 0.695** 4.906*** 1.001**
Cash_Flowmedium,i,t –3.622** –0.806 5.312** 3.607*** 0.619 5.486*** –1.448** –3.102** –2.722**
Cash_Flowsmall,i,t –0.573 2.926** –10.900*** –1.027 2.462* –4.633*** 1.258** 3.805*** 1.864***
Trend 0.000 0.000 0.013*** –0.004*** 0.001 –0.001 –0.002*** 0.001 –0.005***
Unemployment_Ratet –0.015 –0.019 –0.069 0.004 –0.006 –0.021 –0.008 –0.033** 0.031
ST_Rate 0.002 –0.027*** 0.157*** –0.001 –0.026*** 0.056** –0.008*** –0.028*** –0.019
LT_Rate –0.007 0.018* –0.090* –0.008 0.017** –0.050* –0.005 0.010 0.006
Growth_Rate –0.814*** –0.146 –3.225*** –0.447** –0.697** –0.476 –0.373*** –0.789*** –0.026
Q2_Dummy 0.006 0.068*** –0.001 0.031*** 0.048*** 0.130*** –0.026*** 0.000 –0.010
Q3_Dummy –0.059*** 0.033 –0.113 –0.003 0.034* 0.017 –0.030*** 0.006 –0.033
Q4_Dummy –0.015 0.072*** –0.082 –0.005 0.032* 0.048 –0.045*** –0.005 –0.039
Constant –1.107*** –0.682*** –4.863*** 1.331*** –1.546*** 1.812** 1.270*** –0.797*** 2.078***
R
2 0.004 0.393 0.606 0.013 0.461 0.437 0.038 0.352 0.531
Note: *** denotes significant at 1 percent, ** denotes significant at 5 percent, and * denotes significant at 10 percent.C. Trade Payables and Short-Term Financial Institution Borrowing
Our empirical results in Tables 18 and 19 show how much trade payables (per finan-
cial institution borrowing) h-size firms would receive conditional on   (h = large,
medium, small), that is, how much trade credith-size firms would receive conditional
on  . However, they do not show from whom h-size firms receive trade credit. In
other words, we cannot identify who provides this trade credit.
Surprisingly, most coefficients on the credit crunch dummies for SMEs are
negative, and many of them are significant. This is surprising given the fact that 
most coefficients on the credit crunch dummies are positive in the trade receivable
(per sales) regression. The increase in trade receivables during the credit crunch 
periods should match the increase in trade payables during the same period.
26 Given
the alleged increase in trade payables during the credit crunch periods, the decrease 
in the ratio of trade payables to the short-term financial institution borrowing 
during the credit crunch periods implies an increase in short-term financial 
institution borrowing. To see this more clearly, we estimate the random effect models
using trade payables and short-term financial institution borrowing as the dependent 
variable, respectively. 
We report the results in Tables 20 to 23. As is conjectured above, many coefficients
on the credit crunch dummies in the trade payable regression and those in the short-
term financial institution borrowing regression are significantly positive. Thus, trade
payables and financial institution borrowing increase significantly during the credit
crunch periods, after controlling for the effects of other explanatory variables.
27
A possible interpretation of the increase in the trade payables is that a kind of sponta-
neous “convoy system” of Japanese private firms like keiretsu might serve as a mutual
insurance system during those periods, though we cannot verify this from our 
data. Regarding the increase in financial institution borrowing, there are two possible
interpretations. First, these findings might be inconsistent with the credit crunch
hypothesis, which is in line with those papers that cast doubt on the existence of a
credit crunch during the Japanese banking crisis because of the “convoy system” used
by policymakers to manage the crises and evergreening and moral hazard problems
(e.g., Nakaso [2001], Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap [2006], Horiuchi and Shimizu
[1998], Watanabe [2006], and Iwatsubo [2007]). Second, these findings might 
be consistent with the credit crunch hypothesis, in the sense that private financial
institutions decreased their lending during this period (i.e., the credit crunch
occurred in the private sector), but public financial institutions canceled out this 
negative effect by increasing their lending. Unfortunately, from our data we cannot
conclude which interpretation is correct, because we cannot distinguish in them between
private financial institution borrowing and public financial institution borrowing.
27
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26. There is a caveat. In the sample, we use the firms whose equity capital is larger than ¥10 million. Therefore, it
might be the case that some of the trade receivables from the sample firms correspond to the trade payables of
much smaller firms that are not included in the sample. As is shown below, however, the results show that the trade
payables of the sample firms increase during the credit crunch periods, as with trade receivables.
27. The introduction of the Special Credit Guarantee Program for Financial Stability during 1998–2001 may explain
why the coefficient onCredit_Crunch3 is significantly positive. See Ono and Uesugi (2005) for a discussion of the













































Table 18  Trade Payables/Short-Term Financial Institution Borrowing
Independent
Large Medium Small
variable All Manufacturing Non- All Manufacturing Non- All Manufacturing Non-
manufacturing manufacturing manufacturing
Tankanlarge –0.001*** –0.004*** 0.001 –0.003*** –0.005*** –0.006*** –0.002** –0.003** –0.005**
Tankanmedium 0.000 0.004*** 0.010*** –0.002* –0.004** 0.014*** –0.005*** –0.011*** 0.010***
Tankansmall 0.001 –0.001 0.003* –0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.011*** –0.002
Bubble_Dummy –0.156*** –0.237*** –0.045 –0.152*** –0.261*** –0.073 –0.446*** –0.577*** –0.033
CP_Dummy –0.003 0.024 0.110 –0.032 –0.032 0.224* 0.275*** 0.371** 0.186
Crunch_Dummy1 –0.170*** –0.205** 0.123 –0.274*** –0.327*** 0.051 –0.183** –0.246** –0.043
Crunch_Dummy2 0.007 –0.063 –0.142** –0.015 –0.084 –0.104 –0.040 –0.012 –0.062
Crunch_Dummy3 0.055 0.011 0.211*** –0.184*** –0.220** 0.017 –0.106 –0.112 –0.008
Invlarge,i,t–1 –0.210*** –0.604*** –0.097** –0.216*** 0.004 –0.373*** –0.318*** 0.310* –0.337***
Invmedium,i,t–1 0.025 –0.899*** 0.009 –0.076 –0.780*** 0.110 0.216** 0.284 0.057
Invsmall,i,t–1 0.046 0.574*** –0.022 0.103* 0.851*** 0.039 0.006 –0.951*** 0.015
Leveragelarge,i,t–1 –0.934*** –5.450*** 0.263 1.196*** –0.232 3.308*** –0.322 2.092*** 2.210***
Leveragemedium,i,t–1 0.803*** 1.611*** 0.560 0.196 3.035*** –0.733 –0.212 2.590*** 0.856
Leveragesmall,i,t–1 –0.613*** 0.169 –1.897*** –0.656*** 0.940** –1.805*** –0.101 –0.347 –1.612***
Cash_Flowlarge,i,t 2.122* –4.016** –1.596* 1.360 4.679** –0.224 –3.276* 2.251 2.293**
Cash_Flowmedium,i,t –3.163 –0.069 –4.754*** –5.438* 10.195** –10.367*** 7.652* 24.794*** –11.682***
Cash_Flowsmall,i,t 0.872 1.232 –1.900* 4.326** –3.340 3.227** 1.882 –7.117 2.011
Trend 0.008*** –0.002 0.015*** 0.005*** 0.003 0.006 –0.019*** –0.016*** –0.003
Unemployment_Ratet –0.077*** 0.003 0.061 –0.092*** –0.009 0.067 0.070 0.120 0.145**
ST_Rate –0.017 –0.017 0.053* –0.060*** –0.061*** 0.007 –0.068*** –0.026 –0.085**
LT_Rate 0.110*** 0.122*** 0.048 0.145*** 0.160*** 0.064 0.098*** 0.047 0.150***
Growth_Rate 2.536*** 3.242*** 0.173 3.026*** 2.208** –0.131 3.619*** 0.752 0.813
Q2_Dummy –0.023 –0.026 –0.058*** 0.022 0.117** –0.038 0.112** 0.157** –0.095
Q3_Dummy –0.025 0.014 –0.144*** 0.028 0.058 –0.132* 0.127** 0.079* –0.168**
Q4_Dummy –0.004 0.012 –0.063 0.051 0.039 –0.028 0.101** –0.016 –0.056
Constant 0.424 4.331*** –0.606 0.277 –2.744*** –0.406 4.315*** –0.426 0.163
R
2 0.068 0.379 0.695 0.140 0.217 0.640 0.314 0.390 0.535

































































































































Table 19  Trade Payables/Short-Term Financial Institution Borrowing: Parsimonious Specification
Independent
Large Medium Small
variable All Manufacturing Non- All Manufacturing Non- All Manufacturing Non-
manufacturing manufacturing manufacturing
Tankan –0.002*** –0.002*** 0.002** –0.006*** –0.006*** 0.002* –0.006*** –0.005*** –0.002*
Bubble_Dummy –0.143*** –0.199*** –0.028 –0.175*** –0.225*** –0.010 –0.365*** –0.430*** –0.010
CP_Dummy –0.150*** –0.124* –0.228*** 0.019 0.018 –0.036 0.273*** 0.247** 0.035
Crunch_Dummy1 –0.267*** –0.259*** –0.057 –0.317*** –0.320*** –0.094* –0.205*** –0.168* –0.104*
Crunch_Dummy2 –0.045 –0.046 –0.075** –0.069 –0.085 –0.048 –0.031 0.020 –0.063
Crunch_Dummy3 0.033 0.053 0.080* –0.172*** –0.183*** –0.063 –0.057 –0.065 0.014
Invi,t–1 –0.129*** –0.825*** 0.048** –0.183*** –1.067*** –0.119*** –0.078 –1.158*** –0.129***
Leveragei,t–1 –0.844*** –0.607 –1.159*** 0.337*** 1.376*** –0.735*** 0.094 0.929** –0.605**
Cash_Flowi,t 0.262 1.495 –0.582* –1.488 2.226 –4.464*** 5.423*** 11.476*** –4.316***
Trend 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.005*** 0.004* 0.009*** –0.013*** –0.014*** 0.000
Unemployment_Ratet –0.169*** –0.175*** –0.092*** –0.084*** –0.053 –0.085*** 0.091** 0.133** 0.017
ST_Rate –0.029** –0.023* 0.001 –0.050*** –0.036** –0.010 –0.041*** –0.026 –0.078***
LT_Rate 0.130*** 0.120*** 0.082*** 0.161*** 0.149*** 0.086*** 0.149*** 0.146*** 0.144***
Growth_Rate 3.562*** 3.334*** 1.634*** 3.314*** 3.151*** –0.002 1.222* –0.897 0.823
Q2_Dummy –0.014 –0.001 –0.051* –0.003 0.028 –0.093*** 0.041 0.057 –0.040
Q3_Dummy –0.010 –0.004 –0.059** –0.028 0.011 –0.148*** 0.073 0.145** –0.118***
Q4_Dummy 0.007 –0.004 –0.006 –0.005 0.000 –0.075** 0.054 0.066 –0.031
Constant 0.043 0.689 –0.761* 0.454*** 0.124 0.528 2.369*** 2.037*** 1.479***
R
2 0.161 0.199 0.119 0.198 0.178 0.448 0.320 0.348 0.403













































Table 20  Trade Payables
Independent
Large Medium Small
variable All Manufacturing Non- All Manufacturing Non- All Manufacturing Non-
manufacturing manufacturing manufacturing
Tankanlarge –0.003*** –0.008*** –0.051*** –0.001** –0.001 –0.050*** –0.003 0.001 –0.100***
Tankanmedium –0.001 –0.001 0.108*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.087*** –0.003 0.005*** 0.188***
Tankansmall 0.008*** 0.018*** 0.042*** 0.001 –0.001 0.027** 0.004 –0.006*** 0.072***
Bubble_Dummy –0.117* –0.355** –0.560 –0.005 –0.057 –0.213 –0.054 –0.027 –0.699
CP_Dummy 0.055 0.256 2.258** 0.191*** 0.050 1.630** 0.310** –0.092 3.678**
Crunch_Dummy1 0.085 –0.304 1.636* 0.042 –0.004 1.017 0.177 0.093 3.325**
Crunch_Dummy2 0.100 –0.002 –0.376 0.086** –0.020 –0.263 0.440*** 0.115 –0.568
Crunch_Dummy3 0.113 0.006 1.189* 0.039 0.020 0.442 0.065 0.020 1.221
Invlarge,i,t–1 –0.207** 1.398*** –3.785*** –0.012 –0.094 –4.147*** –0.021 –1.020*** –8.405***
Invmedium,i,t–1 0.053 –2.026*** 1.907*** –0.049 –0.561*** 2.112*** 0.076 0.314** 4.372***
Invsmall,i,t–1 –0.057 –2.229*** 0.598 –0.036 –0.248*** 1.110*** –0.351** –0.489*** 1.833**
Leveragelarge,i,t–1 4.192*** –8.816*** 27.467*** 0.695** –3.330*** 20.973*** 1.536* –5.754*** 41.245***
Leveragemedium,i,t–1 3.802*** 7.923*** –1.656 1.315*** 1.920*** –0.278 1.595** 1.799*** –2.449
Leveragesmall,i,t–1 1.172*** –4.074*** –9.810*** 0.190 –0.923*** –4.205 1.236** –0.176 –9.379
Cash_Flowlarge,i,t –2.050 –12.352** –17.796** –0.131 1.541 –14.892** 0.037 8.675*** –42.386***
Cash_Flowmedium,i,t –5.756 29.799*** –40.994** –2.056 –1.685 –30.250** –2.196 –20.608*** –50.901
Cash_Flowsmall,i,t –0.487 –11.511 6.110 –0.280 –0.937 11.283 –3.769 2.055 9.696
Trend 0.041*** –0.005*** 0.056* 0.010*** –0.004*** 0.021 0.016*** –0.003 0.031
Unemployment_Ratet –0.220*** 0.180*** 0.744 –0.103*** 0.024 0.706* –0.491*** –0.146** 0.836
ST_Rate 0.006 0.091* 0.279 –0.013 0.020* 0.121 –0.076** 0.004 0.170
LT_Rate 0.098*** 0.000 –0.059 0.044*** 0.009 –0.044 –0.013 0.003 –0.501
Growth_Rate 2.345** –2.977 –3.041 0.929* 0.018 –1.374 –0.660 1.792* –12.237
Q2_Dummy –0.118** –0.014 0.379 –0.047 –0.008 0.818* –0.149* –0.061 1.752*
Q3_Dummy –0.142** –0.073 –0.397 –0.062* –0.034 0.087 –0.228** –0.113* –0.062
Q4_Dummy –0.037 –0.131 0.158 0.013 –0.015 0.608 –0.045 –0.026 1.168
Constant –9.400*** 5.429*** –14.942* –1.478** 2.860*** –12.325* –0.146 5.606*** –13.274
R
2 0.164 0.190 0.690 0.143 0.418 0.639 0.144 0.378 0.666

































































































































Table 21  Short-Term Financial Institution Borrowing
Independent
Large Medium Small
variable All Manufacturing Non- All Manufacturing Non- All Manufacturing Non-
manufacturing manufacturing manufacturing
Tankanlarge –0.001 –0.004** –0.017** 0.001** 0.000 –0.003 0.001 0.001 –0.026*
Tankanmedium –0.003* 0.000 0.021*** –0.001 0.003*** 0.010** –0.010*** 0.005*** 0.044***
Tankansmall 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.022*** –0.003*** –0.002*** 0.000 –0.005 –0.007*** 0.031**
Bubble_Dummy 0.336*** 0.015 0.281 0.164*** 0.019 0.215 0.515*** 0.045 1.027*
CP_Dummy 0.220 0.043 1.634* 0.079 0.026 0.622* –0.155 –0.056 0.685
Crunch_Dummy1 0.215** –0.070 1.040** 0.030 0.039 0.474 0.242 0.056 2.226***
Crunch_Dummy2 0.262*** 0.155* 0.344 0.169*** –0.002 0.223 0.563*** 0.049 0.776
Crunch_Dummy3 0.247** 0.178* 0.223 0.155*** 0.062** 0.244 0.035 0.090 0.280
Invlarge,i,t–1 –0.045 1.394*** –1.945*** 0.170*** –0.142*** –1.495*** 0.047 –0.767*** –2.415***
Invmedium,i,t–1 0.186 –0.815*** 1.302*** 0.364*** –0.377*** 1.326*** 0.567*** –0.276** 2.164***
Invsmall,i,t–1 0.275*** –1.290*** 0.255 0.408*** –0.130** 0.724*** 1.157*** –0.125 1.621***
Leveragelarge,i,t–1 13.140*** 1.473*** 28.490*** 2.750*** –1.927*** 6.684*** 6.370*** –3.951*** 11.766***
Leveragemedium,i,t–1 0.642 0.358 2.463 1.253*** 0.006 2.300 1.746** –1.219*** –0.604
Leveragesmall,i,t–1 3.549*** –2.127*** 2.272 0.952*** –0.428*** 3.861*** 4.166*** 0.364 7.597**
Cash_Flowlarge,i,t 6.939** –0.317 3.794 0.022 1.220* –11.322*** –2.981 3.393** –40.739***
Cash_Flowmedium,i,t –14.091** 8.310 –2.310 3.845 –6.068*** 16.525** 10.116 –20.854*** 46.540**
Cash_Flowsmall,i,t –2.477 –3.593 –20.633*** –1.936 1.226 –14.732*** –9.466 1.581 –36.063***
Trend 0.042*** 0.005 0.045*** 0.012*** –0.005*** 0.008 0.037*** –0.004 0.074**
Unemployment_Ratet –0.333*** –0.003 –0.245 –0.128*** 0.020 0.053 –0.628*** –0.123*** –0.784
ST_Rate 0.011 0.075*** 0.161 –0.010 0.014** 0.056 –0.103*** 0.001 0.345
LT_Rate –0.054 –0.070* –0.409** –0.026* –0.020** –0.218* –0.070 –0.037 –0.865**
Growth_Rate –2.230* –4.585*** –9.010** 0.391 –0.057 –1.449 0.817 1.386 –12.529
Q2_Dummy –0.159** –0.013 0.021** –0.017 –0.031* 0.570*** –0.048 –0.092** 1.326**
Q3_Dummy –0.176** –0.073 –0.124 –0.007 –0.027 0.226 –0.009 –0.105** 0.679
Q4_Dummy –0.160** –0.074 –0.241 –0.019 –0.005 0.228 –0.024 –0.036 0.685
Constant –14.913*** 0.786 –25.445*** –4.298*** 3.075*** –7.783** –9.550*** 6.554*** –12.349
R
2 0.431 0.208 0.789 0.405 0.458 0.702 0.444 0.396 0.669













































Table 22  Trade Payables: Parsimonious Specification
Independent
Large Medium Small
variable All Manufacturing Non- All Manufacturing Non- All Manufacturing Non-
manufacturing manufacturing manufacturing
Tankan –0.001 0.002** –0.011*** –0.001 0.001*** –0.004 –0.002 0.002*** 0.011
Bubble_Dummy –0.044 0.158** –0.288* –0.023 0.004 –0.060 0.004 0.176*** –0.271
CP_Dummy 0.087 –0.169 0.637*** 0.222*** 0.024 0.602*** 0.338** –0.164*** 1.453***
Crunch_Dummy1 0.199** 0.067 0.357 0.054 0.016 0.258* 0.129 –0.048 1.621***
Crunch_Dummy2 0.201*** 0.097 0.586*** 0.088** 0.008 0.337*** 0.474*** 0.261*** 0.762**
Crunch_Dummy3 0.220*** 0.205** 0.098 0.056 0.055*** 0.070 0.204* 0.110** 0.180
Invi,t–1 –0.133** –0.990*** –0.068 –0.083** –0.646*** –0.023 –0.345*** –1.086*** –0.965***
Leveragei,t–1 4.668*** 3.735*** –0.184 1.410*** 1.796*** 0.926 1.543*** 1.165*** 1.725
Cash_Flowi,t –5.282*** –15.890*** –2.209 –2.174* –1.057* 1.032 –5.867* –2.563** –20.638**
Trend 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.015** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.000
Unemployment_Ratet –0.264*** -0.291*** –0.243** –0.090*** –0.030** –0.194** –0.466*** –0.227*** –1.096***
ST_Rate 0.001 0.054** –0.058 –0.009 0.022*** 0.003 –0.061** 0.004 –0.197
LT_Rate 0.067** 0.015 0.083 0.044*** 0.010 –0.002 0.051 0.048*** –0.355*
Growth_Rate 2.707*** 3.575*** 2.305 0.924* –0.005 0.282 –2.265* –1.370*** –8.871*
Q2_Dummy –0.094** –0.057 –0.332*** –0.049* 0.002 –0.116 –0.134** –0.015 –0.580**
Q3_Dummy –0.095** –0.043 –0.293** –0.060** –0.012 –0.125 –0.243*** –0.076** –0.907***
Q4_Dummy 0.003 0.021 –0.102 0.015 0.008 0.071 –0.075 –0.053* –0.304
Constant –4.436*** –3.416*** 3.131 –0.693 –1.577*** 1.407 1.662 –1.262*** 13.218**
R
2 0.172 0.001 0.061 0.105 0.008 0.000 0.096 0.096 0.200

































































































































Table 23  Short-Term Financial Institution Borrowing: Parsimonious Specification
Independent
Large Medium Small
variable All Manufacturing Non- All Manufacturing Non- All Manufacturing Non-
manufacturing manufacturing manufacturing
Tankan 0.001 0.004*** –0.024*** –0.003*** 0.001** –0.016*** –0.013*** 0.001** –0.017**
Bubble_Dummy 0.335*** 0.313*** 0.256 0.088** 0.055*** –0.030 0.391*** 0.113*** 1.189***
CP_Dummy 0.504*** –0.186*** 1.560*** 0.164*** 0.009** 0.827*** 0.072 –0.108** 0.603
Crunch_Dummy1 0.465*** 0.138** 0.492 0.032 0.036 0.306* 0.260* –0.043 1.788***
Crunch_Dummy2 0.417*** 0.164*** 0.826*** 0.173*** 0.019*** 0.581*** 0.576*** 0.142*** 1.644***
Crunch_Dummy3 0.324*** 0.168*** –0.320 0.125*** 0.076*** 0.078 0.157 0.126*** –0.351
Invi,t–1 0.550*** 0.581*** 0.291** 0.781*** –0.156** 0.860*** 1.471*** –0.252** 0.672**
Leveragei,t–1 12.992*** 1.509*** 20.560*** 2.098*** 0.609*** 2.559*** 4.354*** 1.089*** 11.443***
Cash_Flowi,t 2.707** –6.893*** 6.490*** 1.596 –1.089** 6.617* –4.185 –3.197** –24.291***
Trend 0.026*** 0.014*** –0.004 0.003* 0.003*** –0.026*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.011
Unemployment_Ratet –0.249*** –0.141*** –0.326** –0.079*** –0.006*** –0.073 –0.478*** –0.158*** –1.037***
ST_Rate 0.039 0.059*** –0.023 –0.024*** 0.016 –0.097*** –0.131*** 0.006 0.017
LT_Rate –0.125*** –0.055*** –0.365*** –0.024 –0.020** –0.190*** 0.007 –0.025** –0.787***
Growth_Rate –4.425*** –0.265 –4.112 0.165 –0.329** 0.713 –0.131 –0.904** –11.036**
Q2_Dummy –0.111** –0.037 –0.429** –0.017 –0.003 –0.061 –0.090 –0.008 –0.396
Q3_Dummy –0.046 –0.030 0.023 0.004 –0.006* 0.055 –0.026 –0.049* –0.310
Q4_Dummy –0.088* 0.008 –0.267 –0.015 0.009 –0.076 –0.031 –0.034 –0.458
Constant –10.207*** –1.188** –9.052*** –1.027*** –0.354*** 4.694 –1.292 –0.925*** 3.417
R
2 0.418 0.025 0.498 0.282 0.047 0.165 0.327 0.180 0.396
Note: *** denotes significant at 1 percent, ** denotes significant at 5 percent, and * denotes significant at 10 percent.Irrespective of the interpretation, the bottom line here is that trade payables and 
short-term financial institution borrowing move in the same direction during the
credit crunch periods in most cases. This suggests they work as complements during
those periods. 
All coefficients on the bubble dummy are negative, and almost all of them are 
significant in the trade payables per short-term borrowing regression. In most cases,
trade payables and short-term financial institution borrowing move in the opposite
direction during the bubble period. This suggests that trade credit and short-term 
borrowing work as substitutes during the bubble period, in contrast to the credit
crunch periods. This finding is consistent with our argument in Sections III and IV
that different types of financial shocks can affect different lending channels differently.
A negative financial shock (e.g., a credit crunch) and a positive financial shock (e.g., 
a bubble) can affect the trade credit channel and the financial institution channel 
differently: as a result, the relation between the trade credit and the financial institution
(complements or substitutes) can change across the credit crunch periods and the 
bubble period.
In the parsimonious specification, the coefficients on theTankan index in the trade
payable regression and those in the short-term borrowing regression have the same sign
within each sector-size category, except for the small firms in the non-manufacturing
sector (see Tables 22 and 23). This suggests that the trade credit channel and the 
financial institution lending channel work as the complements, in almost all sector-size
categories, during the normal period. Notice that there is a sharp contrast between the
manufacturing sector and the non-manufacturing sector.
28 In the manufacturing 
(non-manufacturing) sector, both trade payables and short-term financial institution
borrowing increase (decrease) when financial institutions become more willing to lend.
We argued in Section V.A on the reallocation of financial institution lending that the
lending may increase in some industries and firm sizes, while it may decrease in others
when financial institutions become more willing to lend. Since trade payables tend 
to move in the same direction as financial institution borrowing when the financial
institution becomes more (or less) willing to lend, the effect of financial institution
lending reallocation on SME finance would be magnified by the change in trade 
credit. This suggests the importance of investigating what drives the reallocation of
financial institution lending.
Consistent with the findings on the commercial paper variable,CP_Dummy, in the
receivables regression we find that the introduction of commercial paper was associated
with a larger use of trade credit for small firms.
VI. Conclusion and Future Research
Recent research emphasizes the breadth of lending technologies that are available to
minimize financing constraints faced by SMEs. This research has also emphasized that
the feasibility and the mix of these lending technologies might differ across countries
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28. Ono (2001) and Ogawa (2003) investigate the manufacturing sector only.with different institutional and legal infrastructures. Missing from this static approach,
however, is an analysis of how the mix of these technologies might be affected by
macroeconomic conditions and, particularly, financial shocks such as changes in mone-
tary policy, credit crunches, and financial crises. This paper builds on the static notion
of lending technologies by introducing the dynamic concept of “lending channels.”
A lending channel is a two-dimensional conduit that consists of a specific lending
technology provided by a specific type of institution. For example, one lending 
channel might consist of relationship lending delivered by small banks. There appear
to exist at least nine different lending technologies globally (i.e., available at least 
somewhere in the world) that may be used to underwrite SME lending: relationship
lending, financial statement lending, trade credit, equipment lending, real estate-based
lending, leasing, factoring, small business credit scoring, and asset-based lending 
(see BU [2006]). We hypothesize that all of these technologies but the last two were
available in Japan during the banking crises. We also hypothesize that there were five
types of institutions that delivered one or more of these technologies during the crisis.
Furthermore, we hypothesize that during the Japanese banking crises the combination
of lending technologies and institution types implied the likely existence of 24 other
lending channels.
The primary focus of our paper is to investigate whether financial shocks lead to the
contraction of some lending channels that may be offset by an expansion of others.
The Japanese banking crisis may be an interesting test of this behavior given the 
concern that there may have been a contraction of bank credit in the SME sector 
during this period. Ideally, to test for relative changes in the importance of lending
channels during financial shocks, we would use firm-level data on SMEs and firm-level
data on lenders. These data would ideally be rich enough to distinguish among the 
different types of lending channels and how flows changed over time. To the best of
our knowledge, no such data exist in the world today. Our data on Japan, however,
allows us the opportunity for a limited test.
Using financial statement data on firms that were aggregated into three size cate-
gories (small, medium-sized, and large) we could uniquely identify one important lend-
ing channel, trade credit extended by corporations. We could also identify a 
combination of other lending channels—the lending channels provided by banks and
nonbanks. We could not, however, distinguish among the many different bank and
nonbank lending channels (e.g., relationship lending by small banks, leasing by
regional banks, real estate lending by large banks, etc). Nevertheless, we could test for
the possibility that during at least some periods of the Japanese banking crisis, the trade
credit lending channel expanded relative to the combination of bank and nonbank
lending channels, the financial institution lending channel. Such a finding would be
consistent with evidence elsewhere that trade credit expands after financial shocks 
lead to a contraction of bank and nonbank credit. Specifically, there is evidence in the
United States that large corporations issue more trade credit funded by commercial
paper during periods of monetary tightening (Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel
[1995]). Interestingly our analysis provided some evidence that the supply of trade
credit did increase with the introduction of the commercial paper market to Japan
independent of the effects of the banking crisis.
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expanded relative to the financial institution lending channel during the Japanese 
banking crisis, looking at both the extension of trade credit (changes in the level of
accounts receivable) and the borrowing of trade credit (changes in the level of trade
payables). We found some evidence that the trade credit and the financial institution
lending move in the same direction during the Japanese banking crisis periods: the trade
credit channel and the financial institution lending channel are complements during
those periods. Moreover, we found some evidence that both the trade credit and the
financial institution lending significantly increased during the Japanese banking 
crisis, after controlling for the effects of other explanatory variables. In contrast to 
complementarity of the trade credit channel and the financial institution lending 
channel during the credit crunch periods, we found some evidence that the trade 
credit channel and the financial institution lending channel are substitutes during 
the bubble period. This finding is consistent with our argument in Sections III and IV
that different types of financial shocks can affect different lending channels differently.
A negative financial shock (e.g., a credit crunch) and a positive financial shock (e.g.,
a bubble) can affect the trade credit channel and the financial institution channel 
differently: as a result, the relation between the trade credit channel and the financial
institution channel (complements or substitutes) can change across the credit crunch
periods and the bubble period.
Another possibility is that lending channel effects depended on the financial 
condition of individual firms. It is possible, for example, that the contraction of 
some of the bank lending channels was limited to credit-constrained firms that might
have been particularly vulnerable to financial distress. This might have occurred, 
for example, if large banks contracted their supply of financial statement lending 
(i.e., a contraction of the large bank financial statement lending channel)—but only
to financially constrained SMEs. Unfortunately, identification of financially con-
strained firms requires at a minimum firm-level data, which were not available to us.
More complex measures of financial constraints require panel data (e.g., Fazzari,
Hubbard, and Petersen [1988], Kaplan and Zingales [1997], Shikimi [2005], and 
von Kalckreuth [2006]).
Finally, we note that our data only allow us to uniquely identify one lending 
channel, the trade credit channel. Therefore, it was not possible to test for changes in
most of the hypothesized lending channels during the Japanese banking crisis. This
precludes, for example, testing whether regional banks increased their relationship
lending to SMEs (i.e., whether the regional bank-relationship channel increased) to
offset a decrease in large bank financial statement lending to SMEs. With 31 hypothe-
sized lending channels, a very large number of channels could have been affected by
the banking crises—most of which we are unable to observe from our data.
Without data that can clearly identify different lending technologies provided 
by different lenders, it may not be possible to adequately test our lending channel 
paradigm. Our empirical analysis here was quite limited and falls considerably short
of a full test of the paradigm. Nevertheless, we conjecture that our lending channel
paradigm may provide a useful framework for policymakers and bank regulators for
analyzing the effects of financial crises on the availability. A growing body of empirical
36 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/NOVEMBER 2007evidence suggests that lending to SMEs is not delivered in a “one size fits all” package.
Moreover, both the academic and practitioner literatures strongly suggest that the
menu of the lending technologies is quite extensive—with many of these technologies
delivered by organizationally distinct units and quite often by different types of 
institutions. Thus, our conjecture that lending technologies delivered by specific types
of institutions constitute lending channels that may contract or expand in response to
financial system shocks seems like a logical extension of the literature on SME credit
availability. Better data and further research, however, are required to confirm the
empirical and economic significance of our lending channel paradigm.
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A. Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry (FSSC)
We explain how we use the FSSC in our estimation. In Section A.1, we explain the
difference of data availability in the FSSC. In Section A.2, we explain which item(s) of
the FSSC we pick up in constructing several variables in our estimation. After picking
up the items, we need to adjust “discontinuities” in these items before constructing
the variables in our estimation. We explain the adjustment in Section A.3.
1. Difference of data availability
We note that a significant portion of data in the FSSC is available in Japanese but 
not in English. There are two “versions” of the FSSC: one is an English version, and
the other is a Japanese version. Both versions divide sample firms by size of capital
stock and industry. In terms of size division, both versions divide firms into three 
categories, as explained above. In terms of industry division, however, there is a significant
difference between these two versions. The English version is a “subset” of the Japanese
version in terms of data availability. On the one hand, in the English version of the
FSSC, firms are divided just into two sectors, manufacturing and non-manufacturing.
On the other hand, in the Japanese version of the FSSC, firms are divided into more
refined industries in each of the manufacturing sector and the non-manufacturing
sector (e.g., food & beverages, textiles, construction, wholesaling, and so on). Put
another way, not all the data available in Japanese are translated into English.
Because there is no guarantee that each refined industry in the same sector behaves
very similarly in terms of trade credit, we may miss some important information on 
trade credit if we aggregate such refined data into the manufacturing sector or the
non-manufacturing sector. Therefore, we use the refined industry-level data in the
Japanese version of the FSSC.
2. Construction of variables
TRh,i,t is the sum of “bills and accounts receivables” and “amounts of notes receivable
discounted.” The reason why we use the sum of these two items, instead of “bills and
accounts receivables” only, is as follows.
29 “Bills and accounts receivables” includes
only those that have not been discounted. “Amounts of notes receivable discounted” is
the amount of trade notes receivable that has already been discounted but has not
become due. If the issuer of the discounted notes (the commodity buyer) defaults on
the liabilities, the firm (the commodity seller) is obliged by law to buy back the 
discounted notes from the bank that discounted them. In other words, the default risk
of trade notes belongs entirely to the firm (the commodity seller), even after getting
them discounted by banks. Therefore, the sum of “bills and accounts receivables” and
“amounts of notes receivable discounted” shows the following: how much credit 
sellers are providing to their buyers. In contrast, “amounts of notes receivable 
discounted” shows something quite different: how much money sellers are borrowing
from banks in the form of what has been discounted. That is why we use the sum of
“bills and accounts receivables” and “amounts of notes receivable discounted” as trade
receivablesTRh,i,t in our estimation.
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29. Here we follow an explanation by Ono (2001).TPh,i,t is “bills and accounts payable.”ST_Borrowingh,i,t is “short-term bank borrow-
ing.” Note that short-term borrowing from non-banks is also included in the item
“short-term bank borrowing,” which is very misleading. That is why we describe
ST_Borrowingh,i,t as “short-term financial institution borrowing” in Table 13 rather
than “short-term bank borrowing.” Cash_Flowh,i,t−1 is the sum of “ordinary income”
and “depreciation.”
3. Adjustment for sample discontinuities in the FSSC
There are discontinuities in the quarterly time-series data of the FSSC. These arise
from a complete renewal of medium-sized firms and small firms in the sample every
April: samples are changed in the first quarter (April to June) of the fiscal year 
and fixed during the following three quarters. In contrast, large firms are sampled 
by the complete enumeration method, so that there is no problem of the sample
renewal. We correct the effect of sample changes to keep the consistency of time-series
data of medium-sized firms and small firms, following the Institute for Social
Engineering (1976).
Let  t−1,i be the change rate of total assets per firm from the ith quarter of the fiscal
year t−1 to the fourth quarter of the fiscal year t−1 and nt−1,i be the number of firms
that are created between the first quarter of the fiscal year t−1 and ith quarter of the
fiscal year t−1, respectively.
 A
end
t−1,4    A
end
t−1,i   t−1,i = ––––– – /
––––– – NFt−1,4 NFt−1,i




t−1,i is the total assets of the first-quarter samples of the fiscal year t−1 as of the
end of the ith quarter of the fiscal year t−1
30 andNFt,i is the number of firms as of the
ith quarter of fiscal year t.
31 The total assets per firms that newly enter the samples at







beginning comprises the total assets of the first-quarter samples of fiscal yeart as of
the beginning of the first quarter of fiscal year t. The discontinuity-adjusted total
assets can be calculated as follows.
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30. The FSSC contains the figures in the balance sheet for both the beginning and end of each quarter covered for the
same sample.
31. We spread out evenly over the past one fiscal year the increment of firms between the fourth quarter in fiscal year
t−1 and the first quarter in fiscal yeart.At,1
beginning −A
end
t−1,4 1 A ˜end
t−1,i = ––––––––––– ––––nt−1,i +A
end
t−1,i





















Assuming that balance-sheet variables grow at the same rate between those firms that
newly enter the samples and those that have been in the samples since the previous 
fiscal year, all the balance-sheet variables as of the ith quarter of fiscal year t−1 are








Samples of firms with equity less than ¥100 million until the fourth quarter of 
fiscal 1988 are chosen from the lists as of January of calendar year t−1 and fixed
throughout the fiscal year t. Following Institute for Social Engineering (1976) to 
correct for this sample selection lag for the small firms, we multiply all the balance-
sheet variables as of the ith quarter of fiscal year t−1b yNFt,1/NFt–1,1 before we make 
adjustment of (A.1). Samples of firms with equity less than ¥100 million after the first
quarter of fiscal 1989 are chosen from the lists as of October of calendar year t−1 and
fixed throughout fiscal year t. Therefore, we multiply all the balance-sheet variables as
of the ith quarter of fiscal year t−1 by (NFt,i/2 + NFt–1,i/2)/NFt–1,i before we make
adjustment of (A.1).
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B. Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan (Tankan)
The survey asks the sample firms if banks are willing (X1), normally ready (X2), or
unwilling (X3) to lend to them. Then the diffusion index (DI) for the lending attitude
of financial institutions (“accommodative” minus “severe”) is calculated as follows.
DI = {Number of firms answering (X1) − number of firms answering 
(X3)}/{number of respondents}.
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